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ABSTRACT
Retweeting a post on a social media platform is a part of a process of
growing signiﬁcance through which public opinion formation takes
place. A ‘retweet count’ on, say Twitter or weibo, can be taken as a
measure of user inﬂuence. The assumption is that when B retweets
A’s message, B empathizes with A and wishes to disseminate the
message more widely. But this assumption has hardly been tested
and preliminary evidence suggests practices for retweeting on
Twitter vary. Nor can retweeting practices on Twitter be assumed
to apply on weibo. This paper makes the ﬁrst effort to understand
the practice of reposting on China’s weibo, focusing on the
content of reposts in comparison to that of the original messages.
A quantitative comparison is made of the frame [Entman,
R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clariﬁcation of a fractured paradigm.
Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58; Gamson, W. A., &
Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on
nuclear power: A constructionist approach. American Journal of
Sociology, 95, 1–37] of the source post of 21 cases, and their
reposts. The posts and reposts all refer to the issue of ofﬁcials
being exposed for corruption on Sina Weibo. The study ﬁnds
sound evidence of networked framing, in which reposters revised
frames of the source posters while disseminating them. Although
over half of the reposts merely republished the source post
without added content, what emerged were new communicative
functions, case deﬁnitions, and a diagnosis of the consequences
of exposing the cases. However, different types of user accounts
drew different reposting frames, which points to a consistent
paradigm between the source accounts and the reposters. The
results are important for understanding the mechanisms behind
the formation of public opinion on weibo.
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Introduction
Changes in information and communication technologies have brought the second media
age (Poster, 1995), in which the mass communication society is being transformed into the
network society (Castells, 2000, 2011). One key feature of communication in this new era
is that the individual can act as a mass communicator in ‘mass-self communication’ (Cas-
tells, 2007, p. 239), involving ‘horizontal networks of interactive communication’ (Castells,
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2007, p. 246), which connect to the mass media’s vertical networks of communication. The
use of social media contributes signiﬁcantly to this new conﬁguration of communication.
To understand the mechanism of information production and communication ﬂow in a
networked environment of social media, scholars have adapted concepts for studying
mass media ‒ including gatekeeping, agenda setting and framing (Meraz, 2011; Meraz
& Papacharissi, 2013; Ragas, Tran, & Martin, 2014; Sayre, Bode, Shah, Wilcox, & Shah,
2010). But little study in this direction has been conducted in China, where social
media is challenging the monopolistic control of public communication by the party-
state. This paper seeks to contribute understanding to this transformation by investigating
the mechanism of content production and dissemination on social media in China. Using
frame analysis, focus is put on how the content of messages may change as they are
reposted. The ﬁeld site is Sina Weibo, a social media platform often described as Twitter’s
equivalent in China that has helped form critical public opinion and mobilize public
action in numerous news events.
Retweet and user inﬂuence on Twitter
Twitter, a social media platform that combines features of social networking service and
blogging, allows users to publish short messages called tweets, each consisting of a
maximum of 140 words. Users can ‘follow’ others and form interconnected networks.
Among the various ways through which a message that is read inﬂuences subsequent
communication, retweeting is considered the most signiﬁcant that ‘has made Twitter
a new medium of information dissemination’ (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010,
p. 596). Retweet count is also the measure most often used by researchers to gauge
user inﬂuence.
Before the retweet functionality was built into Twitter in late 2009, users had developed
various conventions to retweet. The typical way was to write ‘RT@’ followed by the user-
name of the author of the original tweet, and then to copy and paste its content. A variant
way was to write ‘via@name’ to attribute the original author without actually copying and
pasting the original tweet. In the convention of writing a tweet, ‘@name’ is used to refer to
a speciﬁc user, and counts as a ‘mention’ when some other user is merely referred to.
To measure the user inﬂuence on Twitter, researchers have focused on the position of
the user in the network and the pattern of message propagation. In the former, what is
examined is the user’s ‘link structure’, such as page-rank (Lee, Kwak, Park, & Moon,
2010, p. 1137) in the network and the number of followers, while in the latter it is the ‘tem-
poral order of information adoption’, involving replies, retweets, and mentions (Lee et al.,
2010, p. 1137). In a study of over 52 million Twitter users, Cha, Haddadi, Benevenuto, and
Gummadi (2010) found a strong correlation between retweet count and mention count,
but discovered that large followings did not necessarily bring many retweets or mentions.
Based on a dataset of over 22 million tweets, Romero, Galuba, Asur, and Huberman (2011)
similarly found that the number of followers of the poster was a weak predictor of the
maximum number of clicks on the retweeted URL. Ranking 41.7 million user proﬁles
in the entire Twittersphere, Kwak et al. (2010) also found that, for 80% of users, only
20% of their followers had ﬁrst been exposed to the thread of a topic through the tweet
sent to them by the writer that they followed, suggesting that information adoption is a
more relevant measure of user inﬂuence than follower number. Cha et al. (2010) suggested
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that follower size was a measure of user popularity, retweet count a measure of the tweet’s
content value, and mention count an indication of the name value of the user.
Political retweeting
Content is not the only factor that explains retweeting (boyd, Golder, &Lotan, 2010; Macs-
kassy &Michelson, 2011), but a clear relationship exists between the content of a tweet and
the degree to which it is retweeted. Spreading the content of the message seemed to be a sig-
niﬁcant motivation behind political retweeting. Ideologically opposed users rarely
retweeted each other (Conover et al. 2011 AQ1). Strongly polarized political webpages were
likely to be linked and retweeted by Twitter users from one political camp only (Dyagilev
& Yom-Tov, 2014). These seem to suggest that retweeters agree with and support the
content of the source tweet. Exactly how retweeting adds to the content of the original
posts, however, is little known. This paper aims to understand this relationship using
frame analysis on China’s weibo posts.
Framing on online social media
Framing, a concept developed to understand the inﬂuence of mass communication mess-
ages on the audience, has been used to study online communication. Gamson and Mod-
igliani (1989) suggested that mass media discourse can be conceived as a set of
‘interpretive packages’, the internal structure of each of which is organized by a frame
(p. 3). Discussing news stories, Pan and Kosicki (1993) referred to the interpretive
package as a ‘theme’, which they described as ‘an idea that connects different semantic
elements of a story’ (p. 59). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identiﬁed three reasoning
devices ‒ ‘roots, consequences and moral evaluation’ ‒ as constituting a frame (pp. 3–4).
Entman (1993) incorporated the overarching ‘interpretive package/theme’ and two of the
three reasoning devices, while adding two others, in his deﬁnition:
to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a com-
municating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem deﬁnition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.
(p. 52)
Generic frames ‒ as opposed to issue-speciﬁc frames ‒ can apply to different topics and are
more abstract (DeVreese, 2005). Notable examples are Iyengar’s (1991) episodic versus
thematic frames, and Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) ﬁve news frames: conﬂict,
human interest, economic consequences, morality, and responsibility.
Most frame studies of social media texts have focused on themoral evaluation embedded
or the theme of the post. Non-proﬁt organizations were found to have framed the 2010
earthquake in Haiti more positively than the news media. While both user types employed
episodic frames on both Facebook and Twitter, the dominant theme used by NPOs was
morality (on Facebook) and the attribution of responsibility (on Twitter), whereas conﬂict
was used bymedia organizations on bothFacebook andTwitter (Muralidharan, Rasmussen,
Patterson, & Shin, 2011). Other reasoning devices, including problem deﬁnition, interpret-
ation of cause or consequence, or recommendation of remedy, have been rarely studied on
social media posts. This study takes reference from the conceptualization of framing to
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make one of the ﬁrst attempts to analyse the frame of microblog posts in a multi-dimen-
sional manner. Its analysis includes the communicative function (as generic theme), case
deﬁnition (as issue-speciﬁc theme), diagnosis of cause, diagnosis of consequence, and rec-
ommendation of remedies. In addition, taking into account the nature of the posts, the diag-
nosis of the consequences of exposing the cases was also analysed.
‘Networked framing’
In news production, frame building occurs when journalists interact with news sources
and with each other within the constraints of news making and organizational and pro-
fessional culture to inﬂuence the frames embedded in news articles (Scheufele, 1999).
Frame setting occurs in news consumption, with news frames inﬂuencing the audience’s
frames of thought (Chong & Druckman, 2007), which in turn affects the individual’s atti-
tudes and behaviours (Chong & Druckman, 2007; DeVreese, 2005), contributing to public
opinion, political socialization, and collective actions. Applying the concept and methods
of studying frames to social media, researchers found that in the online networked
environment frame building and frame setting are no longer two distinct processes, as
users are both consumers and authors of messages. Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) con-
sidered the act of retweeting on social media as involving frame setting and contributing
to frame building. Citizen users on Twitter engaged in ‘networked framing’ with elite users
(p. 6), in which ‘frames were persistently revised, rearticulated, and redispersed by both
crowd and elite’ (p. 1). But leaders and participants do not play equal roles in ‘networked
framing’. Bashir (2012) found that in the Egyptian 6 April youth movement in 2011,
leaders’ framing on Facebook inﬂuenced participant framing in four of ﬁve cause
frames, and participant framing inﬂuenced leadership framing only in one motivational
frame. This study will compare the frames of retweets to those of their original message
to shed light on the processes of networked framing.
Communication and reposting on weibo
In China, broadcasting is administered by four levels of government, while newspapers
can only be published under licence with an ofﬁcial agency above the county level as pub-
lisher. The Internet infrastructure is owned by state enterprises and is subject to layers of
technical blockage and ﬁltering known as the Great Firewall. All domestic and inter-
national Internet service providers are held responsible for their published content,
which necessitates extensive mechanisms of self-censorship, the refusal of which led to
Google moving its search engine out of mainland China to Hong Kong (an ex-British
colony run under a different political system as a special administrative region of
China). After the riots in Urumqi in July 2009, Chinese microblogging services were
shut down and international social media, including Twitter and Facebook, were
blocked. Sina, one of the big four commercial news portals, launched its free microblog-
ging service ‒ branded as Weibo ‒ with a line-up of movie and singing star users in mid-
August that year. It soon became the most popular microblogging service in China and
‘weibo’ became the Chinese synonym of microblogging. Also offered by other companies,
weibo claims a total of 1.3 billion Chinese accounts, subscribed to by 45.5% of mainland
Chinese Internet users, which accounts for 45.8% of the entire population.
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Like Twitter, messages published on weibo are limited to 140 characters, but the
Chinese language allows for more content than a text of 140 words in English. Users of
Sina Weibo are prompted to bring in their ofﬂine social networks and make new connec-
tions during the sign-up process and also when using the application. As a result, users
‘follow’ and are ‘followed’ by many other users ‒ celebrities, professionals, experts, news
organizations, and commercial companies ‒ who do not form part of their ofﬂine social
networks. Top users on Sina Weibo have a following of over 70 million. Messages that
are ‘published’ or ‘reposted’ by a user are sent to the home page of the user’s ‘fans’,
while all reposts of the same message are threaded chronologically and accessible under
the original content. The interconnected social networks on weibo mean that published
content, through reposts, can achieve large-scale public dissemination that bypasses the
ofﬁcially controlled mass media system.
On weibo, leisure and mood made up the largest category of hot posts (Li et al., 2015).
And despite compliant collaboration of the weibo service providers with the party-state to
censor content (Lagerkvist, 2011), weibo has helped form critical public opinion and
mobilized public action in the past few years. The Chinese authorities, once alerted,
responded either by cracking down (Chin &Mozur, 2013; Patience, 2013), or by incorpor-
ating its more famous users (Li, 2013), and by enhancing their own use of weibo (People’s
Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Ofﬁce, 2013). In April 2013, China’s President,
Xi Jinping, cited Internet forums, blogs and weibo as some of the channels used by hostile
Western forces to inﬁltrate China’s ideological sphere (Buckley, 2013).
Weibo’s built-in repost function automatically offers an input box for the reposter to add
content. Nevertheless, reposted messages are still assumed to agree with the original. A
Chinese judicial interpretation in September 2013 made people who publish online
rumours liable to defamation charges if their messages are reposted 500 times or more
(Mu, 2013). A study about the exposure of corrupt ofﬁcials on Sina Weibo found that
the most reposted accounts were those of news organizations and Sina News, and the
content of the majority of their messages was nearly identical to that published by ofﬁcial
bodies (Nip & Fu, in press AQ2). Does this mean that weibo users were participating in disse-
minating the ofﬁcial version of the cases by reposting them? This does not agree with the
general perception that Chinese citizens form critical opinions and mobilize protest actions
about social issues on online spaces including weibo (Chin, 2011; Tai, 2006; Tong & Lei,
2013).
Anger and Kittl (2011) suggested ﬁve ways in which users might react to tweets that they
read: with compliance, identiﬁcation, internalization, neglect, or disagreement. Would
Chinese netizens on weibo retweet with added content that disagrees with the original
message? Do ofﬁcial accounts draw different reposting behaviours from civilian accounts
on weibo? How are messages published by mainstream news organizations reposted in
the horizontal network on weibo? This paper addresses these questions by examining the
content of the reposts against that of 21 original messages about corrupt ofﬁcials.
Framing on weibo
Few published studies on China’s weibo have looked into different types of framing by
different types of users. A study found that the majority of weibo posts framed environ-
mental protests as conﬂicts between the state and the people, and between economic
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development and the well-being of citizens. They also attributed responsibility for wrong-
doings to the government (Sukosd & Fu, 2013). These ﬁndings are consistent with the view
that weibo is a space for challenging the authorities (Chin, 2011). However, conﬂict frames
were likely to have appeared in citizen posts but not necessarily in posts of other user
types. Indeed, weibo users have suggested frames in a poll about the death of a toddler
in a hit-and-run incident that competed with the ofﬁcial frame of ‘moral crisis’ (Wang,
2013). Recognizing the importance of the Internet, agencies of the Chinese Communist
Party and government have tried hard in the past few years to use weibo and other Internet
spaces as ‘the foreground of disseminating socialist advanced culture’ (Hu, 2008). On Sina
Weibo alone, there were 79,000 ofﬁcial accounts in June 2013, an increase of 75% over the
previous year, which in turn, was an increase of 150% compared to the end of 2011
(People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Ofﬁce, 2013). How the framing by
various user types on weibo differ from each other, and how their different message
frames propagate through reposting reﬂect upon weibo as a space of competing discourses
in the formation of public opinion.
Research questions
A survey found that over 80% of Chinese citizens consider corruption to have exceeded the
limit of toleration (News.sohu.com, 2009).China’s new leaderXi Jinping,whocame topower
at the 18th PartyCongress inNovember 2012, pronounced battling corruption as his top pri-
ority. The leadership framed corruption as a problem of individual cadres, inadequate super-
vision, and little restriction on power. Strengthening disciplinarymechanisms and building a
well-ordered system with a normal work style were said to be the solutions.
Weibo became one of the main sites of an ofﬁcial anti-corruption campaign. Given the
concern of both citizens and the Party, the anti-corruption effort provides an excellent case
for studying the framing of public opinion on the weibo platform. Speciﬁcally, this study
aims to answer these research questions:
(1) Do the frames of messages on corruption cases on Sina Weibo inﬂuence the frames
of their reposts?
(2) Do the frames of messages on corruption cases published by different account types
on Sina Weibo inﬂuence the frames of their reposts differently?
Methods
Data and sampling
A search was conducted to identify corruption cases in China’s news reports after the 18th
Party Congress. The ﬁrst case was identiﬁed on 20 CM1
¶
November 2012 and another 30 cases in
the following two months, up to 19 January 2013. The Sina Weibo search engine was then
used to identify the earliest reposted messages of each of the cases. Eight cases for which
the ﬁrst reposted message was deleted were excluded, as were two other cases (in one case
the exposure occurred on two distinct dates separated by a long interval, and in another
case there were hardly any reposts). In each of the remaining 21 cases, one of the most
reposted early messages was captured with all its reposts by sending a request to the
Weibo search Application Programming Interface (API). In most cases, the captured
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source post was the one with the greatest number of reposts in the ﬁrst three hours follow-
ing the exposure of the case. In other cases, the choice of the source post took into account
the mix of user types so that news organizations, the Sina Headline News account, govern-
ment/Party bodies, Independent news,1 and citizens were included.
After eliminating duplicates, a total of 22,719 reposts2 were captured with 21 original
posts. Reverse proportional sampling ranging from 3% to 15% was applied to the
reposts of each case. Cases with fewer than 100 reposts had 100% of the reposts included
in the sample. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 1956 reposts and 21 original posts. In each
case, a frame analysis was applied to the sampled reposts and the source post.
Coding protocol
Taking reference from Entman’s (1993) scheme of frame functions, and Gamson and
Modigliani’s (1989) list of reasoning devices, and beneﬁting from Pan and Kosicki’s
(1993) recognition of the structuring function of the theme of the text as a frame, the
coding protocol consisted of six frame functions (communicative function, case deﬁnition,
diagnosis of cause, diagnosis of consequences, diagnosis of the consequences of exposure
of the case, recommendation of remedy). Following the grounded-theory approach
(Strauss & Corbin, 2015), a sub-sample of messages was read to derive the issue-speciﬁc
frames of each frame function, taking into consideration Iyengar’s (1991) differentiation
between episodic and thematic frames.
The overarching theme of every post was identiﬁed as one of 10 communicative func-
tions. On the deﬁnition of the corruption case, two episodic frames and ﬁve thematic
frames, each focusing on one particular context, were applied. The two episodic frames
were human interest and corruption aspects. The ﬁve thematic frames considered the
case as relating principally to one of the following:
. locality, an organization, or an area
. China
. PRC/CCP ofﬁcials
. PRC/CCP institution/rule3
. bad situations/people in general.
In addition, two thematic frames pertaining to the exposure of the case and freedom of
expression were used if the content of the message did not focus on but was relevant to the
case of corruption itself. Appendix 1 lists the frames of all the frame functions.
Coding
Coding was conducted by two students who had completed a Master’s degree in media
and communications in Hong Kong. After both coders had gone through two rounds
of trial coding of 129 reposts, during which the coding protocol was reﬁned and different
codings discussed, the two coders coded another 182 (9.3%) of the sampled 1956 reposts
side by side to calculate inter-coder reliability. The rest of the sampled reposts were divided
between the two for coding. The 21 source posts were coded afterwards using the same
coding protocol. The inter-coder reliability test, conducted on the pilot sample of 182
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posts for all frames, was 0.96 (communicative function), 0.98 (case deﬁnition), and 1 (all
others). For each frame function, statistical tests were conducted on the differences in
frames embedded in the source posts and their reposts across the four account types.
Results
Publishers of the source posts were categorized into: (1) Government/Party body (n = 3);
(2) News organizations/online media (n = 11); (3) Independent news AQ3(n = 5); and (4)
Others (n = 2) (see Note 1).
Almost half of the total sampled reposts (n = 941, 48.1%) republished the source post
without added content. Another 2.5% (n = 49) directed the source message to particular
addressees without adding content. This means that just over half (n = 990, 50.6%) of
reposts merely replicated the frame of the source post. Excluding the 58 (3.0%) reposts
whose content was not related to the case, the remaining 46.4% (n = 908) of reposts con-
tained added content relevant to the case. They included reposts that contained only one
or more of the default emoticons provided by the Weibo interface (n = 93, 4.8%) (Table 1).
No statistically signiﬁcant difference was found for any of the frame functions in the
source posts between the account types. It is hard to determine whether this was due to
the small sample size (n = 21). In the reposts, statistically signiﬁcant variations were ident-
iﬁed across account types in all frame functions except the Diagnosis of cause and the
Diagnosis of consequences.
Communicative function
The communicative function of the majority of the source posts was ‘information pro-
vision’ (n = 17, 81.0%), while that of the reposts was ‘disseminating/attending to the
Table 1. Typical source posts of different user types.
Type of source post account Example of source post
Government/Party body #Micro notice# Former Deputy Mayor of Ying De City People’s Government, former Director
of the Public Security Bureau, ZhengBeiquan, is under investigation by the Communist Party
Qing Yuan City Disciplinary Inspection Committee and investigation by the Party
Organization for suspected embezzlement, breaking the law, and serious economic
problems.
News organizations/online
media
[Shenzhen Population Planning Committee Director under investigation for suspected
violation of (Party) discipline] Secretary of the Hygiene Work Committee of the Shenzhen
City Committee, and Secretary of the Party Group and Director of the Shenzhen City
Hygiene and Population Planning Committee, Jiang Hanping, is suspected of serious
violations of [Party] discipline and is under investigation by the Party Organization. Nanfang
Daily. http://t.cn/zjK31xy
Independent news Deputy Director of Shanxi Shenmu Agricultural and Commercial Bank, and National People’s
Congress deputy of the City possesses two identity cards with the names Gong Aiai and
Gong Xianxia, and owns twenty properties in Beijing worth almost 1 billion yuan. Among
them, three apartments alone – 3607, 3608, and 3609 in block three, courtyard 8, Chao Yang
district, Gong Ti Bei Lu, Beijing – are worth more than 100 million. A blue-collar worker with
a monthly salary of 3000 yuan has to work for 2700 years, and a white-collar work with a
monthly salary of 5000 yuan has to struggle for 1700 years to buy them. This is a sad
reminder: What should we do about our lives?
Others Reporting hundred-million dollar-village ofﬁcial in Xiaolan Town, Zhongshan City!! Please
see the photos below for details! I hope superiors will investigate thoroughly to see if any
behaviour that violates the law or the Party discipline exists!! @GDTV news frontline
@Xiaolan Entertainment news @Xiaolan News @Safe Zhongshan @Nanfang Daily
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case’ (n = 1101, 56.3%) (Table 2). The difference between the source posts and reposts is
statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test, p < .05), which is understandable given the differ-
ent position of the source posts and reposts in the chain of communication. Interestingly,
691 (35.3%) of the reposts contained communicative functions not found among the
source posts, the most prominent being ‘analysis/interpretation/opinion/judgement pro-
vision’ (n = 323, 16.5%), and ‘expressing emotion’ (n = 256, 13.1%).
Reposts of messages published by News organizations/online media carried the com-
municative functions ‘analysis/interpretation/opinion/judgement provision’ (n = 220,
20.5%) and ‘expressing emotion’ (n = 154, 14.4%) far more than reposts to other
account types (χ2 (30) = 179.0, p-value < .05), although none of their source posts con-
tained either of these frames. This shows the importance of the news and online media
as the basis for forming public sentiment and opinion. Reposts of messages by Govern-
ment/Party bodies were the least likely to serve the ‘expressing emotion’ (n = 5, 5.4%)
or ‘analysis provision’ (n = 9, 9.7%) functions (Table 3).
Case deﬁnition
The 21 source posts overwhelmingly framed the cases as episodic: ‘about corruption
aspects of the case’ (n = 20, 95.2%), whereas slightly more than one-third (n = 722,
36.9%) of reposts contained added text content relevant to the case that gave a deﬁnition
of the case (Fisher exact test, p < .05). Among them, the episodic frame of the corruption
case remained the most prominent (n = 364, 44.7%; 18.6% of total reposts). As in commu-
nicative function, new case deﬁnitions (n = 174, 8.9% of the total) not found among source
posts had emerged: The most conspicuous was the thematic frame ‘about corruption in
China in general’ (n = 93, 11.4% of reposts with case deﬁnition; 4.8% of the total).
While 4.8% (n = 1) of source posts deﬁned the case as ‘about corruption in the locality,
organization, or issue area’, 11.2% of reposts with case deﬁnition (n = 91, 4.7% of the
Table 2. Typical reposts of various communicative functions.
Communicative function Example of repost
Disseminating the case/attending to
the case
Republishing the weibo.
Expressing emotion Fxxk. Always comes in a pair.
Expressing a sense of morality/public
duty/justice
People are acting. Heaven is watching.
Information seeking Is this true? Again I don’t comprehend the truth.
Information provision Someone on Twitter said those above division level will be investigated one by
one next year. Fxxk. It’s Twitter news. I don’t know if it is true. Don’t check the
water meter [‘Check the water meter’ refers to police using fake excuses to arrest
people].
Analysis/interpretation/opinion/
judgement seeking
Never ending! Taxpayers ask: Is there money left in the national coffer?
Analysis/interpretation/opinion/
judgement
Provision
Property prices will fall with the anti-corruption campaign. To save their lives they
must sell their properties urgently. To save their jobs they dare not buy properties
any more. Reforming and curbing corruption are the ultimate cures to stabilize
property prices.
Making suggestions The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection should intervene, and should
not leave the investigation to the Housing Security and Management Bureau.
Calling for action/Mobilizing More action please, Qiang and Ping [Qiang refers to China’s Premier and Ping
refers to Xi Jinping, China’s President].
Propaganda Anti-greediness and anti-corruption. No slacking.
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Table 3. Communicative function of source posts and their reposts of different user types.
%
Source
(total)
Repost
(total)
Source
(g/p)
Repost
(g/p)*
Source
(news)
Repost
(news)*
Source
(ind n)
Repost
(ind n)* Source (o) Repost (o)*
Disseminating the case/attending to the
case
9.5 56.3 33.3 65.6 9.1 48.7 0.0 66.0 0.0 64.0
Expressing emotion 0.0 13.1 0.0 5.4 0.0 14.4 0.0 11.7 0.0 14.3
Expressing a sense of morality/public
duty/justice
0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Information seeking 9.5 3.1 0.0 5.4 0.0 2.5 40.0 3.6 0.0 4.0
Information provision 81.0 5.3 66.7 7.5 90.9 8.3 60.0 0.8 100.0 1.1
Analysis/interpretation/opinion/
judgement
seeking
0.0 1.8 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.8 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.1
Analysis/interpretation/opinion/
judgement
provision
0.0 16.5 0.0 9.7 0.0 20.5 0.0 12.0 0.0 11.4
Making suggestions 0.0 2.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.3 0.0 4.0
Calling for action/Mobilizing
Propaganda
0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other communicative function 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Note: g/p: government/Party body; news: news organizations/online media; ind n: independent news; o: others.
*Difference in frames used in the reposts across the four account types, p-value < .05.
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total) did so. A total of 9.0% (of reposts with case deﬁnition, 3.3% of the total) (n = 65) of
the reposts advanced thematic frames that deﬁned the cases as ‘about People’s Republic of
China/Chinese Communist Party (PRC/CCP) ofﬁcials’ (n = 24), or ‘about PRC/CCP insti-
tution/rule’ (n = 41).
All source posts from Government/Party bodies framed the cases as episodic corrup-
tion cases, but 6.5% (n = 6) of their reposts framed the cases thematically as ‘about corrup-
tion in China in general’ and 4.3% (n = 4) as ‘about corruption in a locality, organization,
or issue area’. One-ﬁfth of reposts of News organizations/online media contained thematic
frames, substantially higher than all other account types (χ2 (42) = 185.0, p-value < .05).
Reposts of News organizations/online media accounts were the most likely to offer the the-
matic frames ‘about PRC/CCP institution/rule’ (n = 32, 3.0%) or ‘about PRC/CCP ofﬁcials’
(n = 17, 1.6%). Amid the ofﬁcial anti-corruption campaign, framing the cases as part of the
general phenomenon of corruption was ofﬁcially acceptable. Indeed, that was the most
likely new frame found in reposts to Government/Party source posts. However, critical
frames that link the cases to the institution or rule of the Communist Party itself would
have been ofﬁcially unacceptable (Yang, 2008), and were almost non-existent in reposts
to Government/Party source posts (Table 4).
Diagnosis of cause
More than half (57.1%, n = 12) of source posts did not contain a diagnosis of cause, while
nearly 38.1% (n = 8) diagnosed the cause as ‘privileges/power of ofﬁcials’. Counting only
those reposts with added text relevant to the case, only a tiny minority of reposts (n = 75,
9.5%) contained a diagnosis of cause. This might mean the reposters concurred with the
diagnosis of cause in the source posts. Indeed, the most common diagnosis of cause among
the reposts was the same as that in the source posts (‘privileges/power of ofﬁcials’). ‘PRC/
CCP institution/rule’ came second.
Diagnosis of consequences
None of the source posts gave a diagnosis of the consequences. Nor did the overwhelming
majority (n = 788, 99.4%) of reposts with relevant added text content. Given that more
than one-third of reposts contained added text that deﬁned the case, the lack of a diagnosis
of consequences is not likely to be the result of the fear of offering one’s view, but may be
the result of refraining from offering views beyond one’s analysis.
Diagnosis of the consequences of exposing the case
None of the source posts touched on the consequences of exposing the cases but 10.7%
(n = 85) of reposts with relevant added text content did. Thirty-nine (4.9%) diagnosed it
as the ‘beginning of serious crackdown on corruption’. While the difference between the
source posts and reposts is not statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test, p > .05), reposts
to the four account types were signiﬁcantly different from each other on the diagnosis
of the consequence of exposure. Reposts to Government/Party bodies were the most
likely to take on this new frame (n = 4, 14.3%), compared to reposts to News organiz-
ations/online media (n = 32, 6.6%). Both Government/Party bodies and News
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Table 4. Case deﬁnition of source posts and their reposts of different user types.
%
Source
(total)
Repost
(total)
Source
(g/p)
Repost
(g/p)*
Source
(news)
Repost
(news)*
Source
(ind n)
Repost
(ind n)* Source (o) Repost (o)*
Episodic – about the human interest of the case 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0
Episodic – about the corruption aspects of the case 95.2 18.6 100.0 14.0 90.9 19.8 100.0 15.4 100.0 25.1
Thematic – about corruption in a locality, organization, or issue area 4.8 4.7 0.0 4.3 9.1 6.6 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.1
Thematic – about corruption in China in general 0.0 4.8 0.0 6.5 0.0 6.3 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.7
Thematic – about PRC/CCP ofﬁcials 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.6
Thematic – about PRC/CCP institution/rule 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 3.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Thematic – about bad situations/bad people in general 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
Thematic – Beyond nature of case about exposure of case 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 5.1
Thematic – Beyond nature of case about freedom of expression/
informant system
0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Content is related but does not deﬁne case 0.0 4.8 0.0 3.2 0.0 4.1 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0
Content is related but deﬁnes case in other ways 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
Content does not relate to case 0.0 3.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.3 0.0 5.1
Default icon only 0.0 4.8 0.0 4.3 0.0 4.9 0.0 3.9 0.0 7.4
Mentioning somebody 0 2.51 0 4.3 0 1.4 0 2.43 0 8.57
No content of any type 0 48.11 0 55.91 0 44.16 0 54.62 0 45.14
Note: g/p: government/Party body; news: news organizations/online media; ind n: independent news; o: others.
*Difference in frames used in the reposts across the four account types, p-value < .05.
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organizations/online media drew reposts with the ‘beginning of serious crackdown on
corruption’ frame – a frame consistent with the frame of ofﬁcial propaganda about
the anti-corruption campaign – more than the other two account types (χ2(21) = 33.3,
p-value = .04).This shows that reposters of ofﬁcial bodies as well as news organizations
and online media were inclined to stay within the ofﬁcially sanctioned boundaries of
speech (Table 5).
Remedy recommendation
Only 9.5% (n = 2) of all source posts contained a remedy frame. More, but still only 14.6%
(n = 116) of reposts (with relevant added text content) suggested a remedy, the most
popular of which was ‘responsibility – investigate/arrest/punish the ofﬁcial involved/all
corrupt ofﬁcials’ (n = 70, 8.8%). Signiﬁcant difference was not found between the frames
of the source posts and those of the reposts as a whole (Fisher exact test, p > .05) but sig-
niﬁcant difference was found between reposts of different account types. While none of the
Government/Party source posts suggested any remedy, their reposts were the most likely
to offer a remedy. About one-third (n = 9, 32.1%) of Government/Party reposts suggested
localized remedies, including ‘responsibility – investigate/arrest/punish the ofﬁcial involved/
all corrupt ofﬁcials’ (n = 6, 21.4%) and ‘reform the governance of the locality/organization
issue area’ were the most popular (n = 3, 10.7) (χ2 (18) = 37.2, p-value = .005). Again,
these remedies are consistent with the party-state’s perspective of treating corruption as a
discipline issue, rather than an issue inherent to the political system (Table 6).
Discussion and conclusion
This study focused on one particular aspect of the reposting practice on China’s Sina
Weibo, namely how the frame of reposts may differ from that of the source post.
Through analysing 21 source posts and samples of their 22,719 reposts about corrupt ofﬁ-
cials, it found evidence of networked framing on Weibo, previously found on Twitter in
other countries. While just over half of the reposts merely replicated the communicative
function of the source posts (which merely disseminated the cases and communicated
information), over one-third advanced new communicative functions (most prominently
‘analysis/interpretation/opinion/judgement provision’ and ‘expressing emotion’). Close to
10% of reposts deﬁned the cases in new ways, including the highly critical case deﬁnition
that framed the cases of corruption as a problem involving PRC/CCPofﬁcials or PRC/CCP
institution/rule. These are evidence that new content is created in Weibo user’s reposting
chains.
Different account types drew different reposting practices. News organizations and
online media drew the most critical reposters, who were the most willing to deﬁne the cor-
ruption cases as problems of the PRC/CCP. Reposts of News organizations and online
media were also inclined to express emotion, make judgement, and frame the cases in a
thematic rather than episodic manner. In contrast, reposters of Government/Party
source posts were more likely to diagnose the exposure of the corruption cases as the
beginning of a serious crackdown on corruption, and to suggest remedies. The focus on
remedies, not criticism, is a notable feature of ofﬁcial-style news reporting in China
(Li, 2008). The speciﬁc remedies offered in the reposts were also consistent with the ofﬁcial
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Table 5. Diagnosis of consequences of exposure of the case in source posts and their reposts of different user types.
%
Source
(total)
Repost
(total)
Source
(g/p)
Repost
(g/p)*
Source
(news)
Repost
(news)*
Source
(ind n)
Repost
(ind n)* Source (o) Repost (o)*
Show casing of crackdown effort only 0.0 1.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Repeat of pervious unsuccessful crackdown
attempts
0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
Uncertain about sustained effort on
crackdown
0.0 2.8 0.0 7.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Beginning of serious crackdown on
corruption
0.0 4.9 0.0 14.3 0.0 6.6 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Decreased level of corruption 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Improved governance/rule in country 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other diagnosis of consequence of
exposure
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
No diagnosis of consequence of exposure 100.0 89.3 100.0 75.0 100.0 87.5 100.0 92.5 100.0 100.0
Note: g/p: government/Party body; news: news organizations/online media; ind n: independent news; o: others.
*Difference in frames used in the reposts across the four account types, p-value < .05.
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Table 6. Recommendation of remedy in source posts and their reposts of different user types.
%
Source
(total)
Repost
(total)
Source
(g/p)
Repost
(g/p)*
Source
(news)
Repost
(news)*
Source
(ind n)
Repost
(ind n)* Source (o) Repost (o)*
Responsibility – Ofﬁcial involved gives up the corrupt money 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
Responsibility – Investigate/arrest/punish the ofﬁcial involved/ all corrupt ofﬁcials 9.5 8.8 0.0 21.4 0.0 8.8 20.0 7.5 50.0 8.0
Reform the governance of the locality/organization/issue area 0.0 1.4 0.0 10.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
Reform the governance of the PRC/CCP in China 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Improve freedom of expression/information/ 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
Improve public transparency/accountability 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other recommendations of remedies 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.0
No recommendations of remedies 90.5 85.4 100.0 67.9 100.0 85.5 80.0 86.3 50.0 90.0
Note: g/p: government/Party body; news: news organizations/online media; ind n: independent news; o: others.
*Difference in frames used in the reposts across the four account types, p-value < .05.
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perspective. This agreement between reposters of Government/Party accounts and ofﬁcial
ideology suggests that, although the reposters had offered new frames, they did not venture
outside the paradigm of the source post accounts that they had followed and reposted.
This ﬁnding may seem counter-intuitive as news of angry sentiments and opinions follow-
ing weibo reports explode into massive public outcries from time to time, to which the
government is forced to respond hastily. The reality is, however, that weibo, after its
early years of existence as a citizen social media, has become a platform on which
various social forces compete for inﬂuence. As stated above, the government/Party is stra-
tegically using the Internet and social media, weibo included, for ideological formation.
The number of weibo accounts of public agencies and ofﬁcials rose in December 2012
by almost 250% over the previous year, totalling 176,700 accounts on four of the weibo
service providers (Sina, Tencent, People’s Daily Online and Xinhuanet) (Wang, 2013),
while the number of news media accounts also rose exponentially. Recognition of the
diverse uses by different weibo account types formed the premise of the present study.
So far, government/Party accounts do not draw very large numbers of reposts (see Note 2),
but their presence can act as a gathering space on weibo for their supporters to form public
opinion that frames issues supportive of the ofﬁcial paradigm AQ4
¶
.
News control imposed by the Chinese party-state deems that government and Party
agencies are the main source of public information. However, the fact that news organiz-
ations are obliged to carry government announcements and propaganda gives non-com-
pliant weibo users who are concerned about government information a choice to follow
news organizations/online media accounts rather than government/Party accounts. This
study found that reposters of News organizations/online media were more likely than
reposters of government/Party bodies to frame the corruption cases as a problem pertain-
ing to the institutions or rule of the Chinese Communist Party itself ‒ a frame that goes
beyond the ofﬁcially acceptable limit. This testiﬁes to the signiﬁcance of the news
media as the basis of critical public opinion, despite tight party-state control imposed
on them. This study did not differentiate, as analysts sometimes do, between party
media and commercial media, out of a recognition that news outlets, irrespective of
their degree of marketization, remain under the instruction of the Chinese Communist
Party.
Unexpectedly, reposters of News organizations and Online media accounts were more
analytical and critical than reposters of independent news accounts, the latter of which
consisted of news workers, independent media workers, online media workers, NPO
workers, and one Hong Kong news organization. The role of Internet-enabled citizen-gen-
erated news in relation to mainstream news has been an issue of interest in recent years. In
China, citizens look to the news media to redress their grievances, given the executive
interference in the court system and an ineffective petition system of the government.
The Chinese Central Television Station, for example, is known for drawing citizen peti-
tioners who try to get their stories broadcast (Zhao, 2000). With the popularity of
weibo, journalists describe their accounts as ‘online petition ofﬁces’ (Bei, 2012–2013).
This suggests that citizens still look to the news media to voice their concerns on their
behalf, even if online social media give them easy channels to do so themselves. The
fact that reposters of news media are more analytical and critical than reposters of inde-
pendent news could be explained by one of several reasons: It is possible that analytical/
critical reposters preferred to follow mainstream news suppliers because of their
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comprehensive content. It is also possible that weibo users who wished to spread their
analysis and criticism chose to repost content published by news organizations as a strat-
egy as news media content is considered ofﬁcially acceptable for dissemination. Another
possibility is analytical and critical reposts to independent news accounts were more likely
to be censored than reposts to news organizations and online media and hence they were
not captured in the current study.
Chinese citizens often rave about the freedom afforded to them by the Internet.
However, some outsiders have visualized the limit of this freedom as a ‘giant cage’
(Epstein, 2013). There is also evidence that opinions among Chinese citizens mirror ofﬁ-
cial statements (Herold, 2013), probably as a result of cultivation in the controlled infor-
mation environment and perpetual propaganda. In the Internet regulatory environment in
China, Internet users are always aware that the party-state does not welcome the posting of
sensitive content. What counts as sensitive content is referred to in blanket terms (Chi-
naITLaw.org, 2010) but in the operation of censorship its interpretation varies from
region to region and from time to time (Wright, 2014). This in itself, some have
argued, makes government controls the more effective as users resort to self-censorship.
The result is, except for the few who are motivated to push for a cause, the typical
users of weibo steer clear of trouble for themselves by not expounding views at all, or if
they do, nothing explicitly contrary to the ofﬁcial ones. Satire is often observed in user-
generated content on the Chinese Internet but it could only be described as ‘enigmatic cri-
ticism’ at best, cynical but not critical in the sense of challenging the hold on power by the
Chinese Communist Party (Lagerkvist & Sundqvist, 2013, p. 143).
It is therefore understandable that less than half of the reposts contained any content
added by the reposters. The new content added offered mainly new communicative func-
tions and case deﬁnitions, but rarely diagnoses of cause, consequence of exposing the
cases, or recommendation of remedies. This testiﬁes to the function of weibo as less a plat-
form of public expression or discussion than one of information. Indeed, this study found
that the communicative function of the majority of the source posts was ‘information pro-
vision’ and that of the reposts was ‘disseminating/attending to the case’.
The exposure of corruption cases is encouraged by the high-proﬁle ofﬁcial crackdown
on corruption. In the campaign, weibo is a prominent communication platform used so
much so that the term ‘weibo anti-corruption’ came into being. If an ofﬁcially endorsed
public issue that has a signiﬁcant impact on people’s livelihood only drew lukewarm dis-
cussion, it can be expected that discussion over other types of issues would be even less
active.
Readers should be cautious in interpreting the statistical results reported above. Despite
the fairly large number of reposts, the small number of the source posts (n = 21) poses a
limitation on the conﬁdence, particularly regarding the difference between the source post
and the reposts. Fisher’s exact test was used to calculate the differences so the low cell
count (<5) does not pose as a major problem. In addition, the inter-coder reliability
ﬁgures could be misleading as the pilot sample used for calculating the reliability
ﬁgures did not contain sufﬁcient variation across all categories. All the reposts in the
pilot sample were coded as ‘no diagnosis of consequences’. A larger pilot sample with
diverse frame categories would be desirable for a more accurate calculation of inter-
coder reliability.
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Notes
1. Categorization was made on the basis of the description given on each of the account’s home
page on Sina Weibo. News organizations, the Sina Headline News, and Government/Party
bodies are veriﬁed accounts whose ofﬂine identity has been conﬁrmed by the Sina Weibo
service provider as corresponding to their online description.
The Sina Headline News was among the most reposted accounts in the exposure of corrup-
tion cases on Sina Weibo (Nip & Fu, in press).
The ‘independent news’ category included news workers, independent media workers,
online media workers, NGO workers, and one Hong Kong news organization. The decision
to include the Hong Kong (an ex-British colony run under a different political system in
China as a special administrative region) news organization under this category was based on
the observation that its post was very different in content from those published by mainland
China’s news organizations but more like those published by individual news/media workers.
2. The number of captured reposts for the source posts published by Government/Party bodies
were, respectively, 701, 293, 29, 21, 10; for News organizations/online media were 3267, 1163,
880, 873, 851, 772, 450, 444; for Independent News were 6778, 2927, 1533, 496, and for
Others were 695, 439, 85, 12.
3. PRC/CCP institution/rule refers to the entire system, in contrast to ‘an organization’, which
refers to an ofﬁcial agency.
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Appendix 1. Coding protocol for content published during forwarding
Unit of analysis: Individual post
Instruction: Choose one category only for each repost except when instructed otherwise.
(1) Communicative function
(Instructions: Choose two for each repost. Input the main communicative function into
one, and the secondary communicative function into two. If only one communicative
function is identiﬁed, choose 12 for function two. If the forwarder inputs no comment,
or ‘@ somebody’ without any self-written comment, choose 1 only.)
(1) Disseminating the case/attending to the case
(2) Expressing emotion
(3) Expressing a sense of morality/public duty/justice
(4) Information seeking
(5) Information provision
(6) Analysis/interpretation/opinion/judgement seeking
(7) Analysis/interpretation/opinion/judgement provision
(8) Making suggestions
(9) Calling for action/Mobilizing
(10) Propaganda
(11) Other communicative function
(12) Unidentiﬁable
(2) Case deﬁnition (Episodic vs thematic frame)
(Instructions: First, decide if the content is related to the case. If it is, then decide if the
framing is episodic – focused on the case alone, or thematic – contextualized).
If more than one applies, choose the largest number.)
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905
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(1) Episodic – about human interest of the case
(2) Episodic – about corruption aspects of the case
(3) Thematic – about corruption in a locality, organization, or issue area
(4) Thematic – about corruption in China in general
(5) Thematic – about PRC/CCP ofﬁcials
(6) Thematic – about PRC/CCP institution/rule
(7) Thematic – about bad situations/bad people in general
(8) Thematic – Beyond the nature of the case – about exposure of the case
(9) Thematic – Beyond the nature of case – about freedom of expression/informant
system
(10) Content is related, but does not deﬁne the case
(11) Content is related, but deﬁnes the case in other ways
(12) Content does not relate to the case [Go to question 7].
(13) Default icon only [Go to question 7].
(14) ‘@somebody’ only [Go to question 7].
(15) No content of any type [Go to question 7].
(3) Diagnosis of the cause of the problem
(1) Personal quality
(2) Morality
(3) Absence of social justice
(4) Privileges/power of ofﬁcials
(5) PRC/CCP institution/rule
(6) Other diagnosis of cause
(7) No diagnosis of cause
(4) Diagnosis of the consequences of the case/phenomenon
(1) Economic – Draining funds of the locality or organization
(2) Economic – Draining funds of the government
(3) Economic – Undermining the economic development of China
(4) Social – Awakening/Reinforcing awareness of the problem in society
(5) Social – Undermining social morals/social values
(6) Social – Undermining the progress of China
(7) Political – Awakening/Reinforcing awareness of the problem under CCP insti-
tution/rule
(8) Political – Undermining the credibility/stability of CCP institution/rule
(9) Political – Undermining the stability of China
(10) Other diagnosis of consequences
(11) No diagnosis of consequences
(5) Diagnosis of the consequences of exposing the case
(1) Showcasing of crackdown effort only
(2) Repeat of previous unsuccessful crackdown attempts
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(3) Uncertain about sustained efforts on crackdown
(4) Beginning of a serious crackdown on corruption
(5) Decreased level of corruption
(6) Improved governance/rule in the country
(7) Other diagnosis of the consequences of exposure
(8) No diagnosis of consequences of exposure
(6) Recommendation of remedies
(1) Responsibility – Ofﬁcial involved gives up the money obtained through corruption
(2) Responsibility – Investigate/arrest/punish the ofﬁcial involved/all corrupt ofﬁcials
(3) Reform the governance of the locality/organization/ issue area
(4) Reform the governance of the PRC/CCP in China
(5) Improve freedom of expression/information/
(6) Improve public transparency/accountability
(7) Other recommendations of remedies
(8) No recommendations of remedies
CM2
¶
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